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Saį¹yutta NikÄya 12.25 Linked Discourses 12.25 Linked Discourses
3. Dasabalavagga 3. The Ten Powers 3. The Ten Powers
Bhūmijasutta With Bhūmija Bhūmija
SÄvatthiyaį¹ viharati. At SÄvatthÄ«.
Atha kho ÄyasmÄ bhÅ«mijo sÄyanhasamayaį¹ paį¹isallÄnÄ vuį¹į¹hito yenÄyasmÄ sÄriputto tenupasaį¹
kami; upasaį¹
kamitvÄ ÄyasmatÄ sÄriputtena saddhiį¹ sammodi. Then in the late afternoon, Venerable BhÅ«mija came out of retreat, went to Venerable SÄriputta, and exchanged greetings with him. We meet BhÅ«mija also in MN 126.Now the venerable BhÅ«mija, arising at eventide from solitary meditation, came into the presence of the venerable SÄriputta, and exchanging greetings with him and compliments of friendship and courtesy sat down at one side,
SammodanÄ«yaį¹ kathaį¹ sÄraį¹Ä«yaį¹ vÄ«tisÄretvÄ ekamantaį¹ nisÄ«di. Ekamantaį¹ nisinno kho ÄyasmÄ bhÅ«mijo Äyasmantaį¹ sÄriputtaį¹ etadavoca: When the greetings and polite conversation were over, he sat down to one side and said to him: and so seated said thus to him:ā
āSantÄvuso sÄriputta, eke samaį¹abrÄhmaį¹Ä kammavÄdÄ sayaį¹
kataį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹ paƱƱapenti. āReverend SÄriputta, there are ascetics and brahmins who teach the efficacy of deeds. Some of them assert that pleasure and pain are made by oneself. āThere are, friend SÄriputta, certain recluses and brahmins, believers in karma, who declare that happiness and ill have been made by one's self;
Santi panÄvuso sÄriputta, eke samaį¹abrÄhmaį¹Ä kammavÄdÄ paraį¹
kataį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹ paƱƱapenti. Some of them assert that pleasure and pain are made by another. certain others who say that happiness and ill have been made by another;
SantÄvuso sÄriputta, eke samaį¹abrÄhmaį¹Ä kammavÄdÄ sayaį¹
kataƱca paraį¹
kataƱca sukhadukkhaį¹ paƱƱapenti. Some of them assert that pleasure and pain are made by both oneself and another. certain others who say both cases are true;
Santi panÄvuso sÄriputta, eke samaį¹abrÄhmaį¹Ä kammavÄdÄ asayaį¹
kÄraį¹ aparaį¹
kÄraį¹ adhiccasamuppannaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹ paƱƱapenti. Some of them assert that pleasure and pain arise anomalously, not made by oneself or another. They believed in the efficacy of deeds, but not that such deeds created pleasure and pain. This seems odd, but itās not irrational. Perhaps they believed that oneās deeds create a new life, but not the experiences of pleasure and pain in that life.certain others who say that neither case is true, but that happiness and ill arise by chance.
Idha no, Ävuso sÄriputta, bhagavÄ kiį¹vÄdÄ« kimakkhÄyÄ«, What does the Buddha say about this? How does he explain it? Herein, friend SÄriputta, the Exalted One what has he to tell us?
kathaį¹ byÄkaramÄnÄ ca mayaį¹ vuttavÄdino ceva bhagavato assÄma, na ca bhagavantaį¹ abhÅ«tena abbhÄcikkheyyÄma, dhammassa cÄnudhammaį¹ byÄkareyyÄma, na ca koci sahadhammiko vÄdÄnupÄto gÄrayhaį¹ į¹hÄnaį¹ ÄgaccheyyÄāti? How should we answer so as to repeat what the Buddha has said, and not misrepresent him with an untruth? How should we explain in line with his teaching, with no legitimate grounds for rebuttal and criticism?ā And how, if we were answering, should we be repeating his views correctly and not be misrepresenting him, nor rendering ourselves open to blame?ā
āPaį¹iccasamuppannaį¹ kho, Ävuso, sukhadukkhaį¹ vuttaį¹ bhagavatÄ. āReverend, the Buddha has said that pleasure and pain are dependently originated. In this discourse, the twelve links are merely hinted at here and in the mention of ignorance at the end.āThe Exalted One has said, friend, that happiness and ill come to pass through a cause,
Kiį¹ paį¹icca? Dependent on what?
Phassaį¹ paį¹icca. Dependent on contact. contact.
Iti vadaį¹ vuttavÄdÄ« ceva bhagavato assa, na ca bhagavantaį¹ abhÅ«tena abbhÄcikkheyya, dhammassa cÄnudhammaį¹ byÄkareyya, na ca koci sahadhammiko vÄdÄnupÄto gÄrayhaį¹ į¹hÄnaį¹ Ägaccheyya. In speaking like this, you would repeat what the Buddha has said, and not misrepresent him with an untruth. You would explain in line with his teaching, and there would be no legitimate grounds for rebuttal and criticism.
TatrÄvuso, ye te samaį¹abrÄhmaį¹Ä kammavÄdÄ sayaį¹
kataį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹ paƱƱapenti, tadapi phassapaccayÄ. Consider the ascetics and brahmins who teach the efficacy of deeds. In the case of those who assert that pleasure and pain are made by oneself, thatās dependent on contact. ā¦ In the case of those recluses and brahmins who believe in karma, however they say that happiness and ill have been made, it was because of contact that they came to pass.
Yepi te ā¦peā¦
yepi te ā¦peā¦
yepi te samaį¹abrÄhmaį¹Ä kammavÄdÄ asayaį¹
kÄraį¹ aparaį¹
kÄraį¹ adhiccasamuppannaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹ paƱƱapenti, tadapi phassapaccayÄ. In the case of those who assert that pleasure and pain arise anomalously, not made by oneself or another, thatās also dependent on contact.
TatrÄvuso, ye te samaį¹abrÄhmaį¹Ä kammavÄdÄ sayaį¹
kataį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹ paƱƱapenti, te vata aƱƱatra phassÄ paį¹isaį¹vedissantÄ«ti netaį¹ į¹hÄnaį¹ vijjati. Consider the ascetics and brahmins who teach the efficacy of deeds. In the case of those who assert that pleasure and pain are made by oneself, itās impossible that they will experience that without contact. ā¦ In no one of those four views is it possible to show that those recluses and brahmins will experience happiness or ill without contact.ā
Yepi te ā¦peā¦
yepi te ā¦peā¦
yepi te samaį¹abrÄhmaį¹Ä kammavÄdÄ asayaį¹
kÄraį¹ aparaį¹
kÄraį¹ adhiccasamuppannaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹ paƱƱapenti, te vata aƱƱatra phassÄ paį¹isaį¹vedissantÄ«ti netaį¹ į¹hÄnaį¹ vijjatÄ«āti. In the case of those who assert that pleasure and pain arise anomalously, not made by oneself or another, itās impossible that they will experience that without contact.ā
Assosi kho ÄyasmÄ Änando Äyasmato sÄriputtassa ÄyasmatÄ bhÅ«mijena saddhiį¹ imaį¹ kathÄsallÄpaį¹. Venerable Änanda heard this discussion between Venerable SÄriputta and Venerable BhÅ«mija. Now Änanda was listening,
Atha kho ÄyasmÄ Änando yena bhagavÄ tenupasaį¹
kami; upasaį¹
kamitvÄ bhagavantaį¹ abhivÄdetvÄ ekamantaį¹ nisÄ«di. Then Venerable Änanda went up to the Buddha, bowed, sat down to one side, and he went into the presence of the Exalted One
Ekamantaį¹ nisinno kho ÄyasmÄ Änando yÄvatako Äyasmato sÄriputtassa ÄyasmatÄ bhÅ«mijena saddhiį¹ ahosi kathÄsallÄpo taį¹ sabbaį¹ bhagavato Ärocesi. and informed the Buddha of all they had discussed. and told him all.
āSÄdhu sÄdhu, Änanda, yathÄ taį¹ sÄriputto sammÄ byÄkaramÄno byÄkareyya. āGood, good, Änanda! Itās just as SÄriputta has so rightly explained. And the Exalted One praised SÄriputta through him and confirmed all that he had said and said yet further:ā
Paį¹iccasamuppannaį¹ kho, Änanda, sukhadukkhaį¹ vuttaį¹ mayÄ. I have said that pleasure and pain are dependently originated.
Kiį¹ paį¹icca? Dependent on what?
Phassaį¹ paį¹icca. Dependent on contact.
Iti vadaį¹ vuttavÄdÄ« ceva me assa, na ca maį¹ abhÅ«tena abbhÄcikkheyya, dhammassa cÄnudhammaį¹ byÄkareyya, na ca koci sahadhammiko vÄdÄnupÄto gÄrayhaį¹ į¹hÄnaį¹ Ägaccheyya. In speaking like this, you would repeat what I have said, and not misrepresent me with an untruth. You would explain in line with my teaching, and there would be no legitimate grounds for rebuttal and criticism.
TatrÄnanda, ye te samaį¹abrÄhmaį¹Ä kammavÄdÄ sayaį¹
kataį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹ paƱƱapenti tadapi phassapaccayÄ. Consider the ascetics and brahmins who teach the efficacy of deeds. In the case of those who assert that pleasure and pain are made by oneself, thatās dependent on contact. ā¦
Yepi te ā¦peā¦
yepi te ā¦peā¦
yepi te samaį¹abrÄhmaį¹Ä kammavÄdÄ asayaį¹
kÄraį¹ aparaį¹
kÄraį¹ adhiccasamuppannaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹ paƱƱapenti tadapi phassapaccayÄ. In the case of those who assert that pleasure and pain arise anomalously, not made by oneself or another, thatās also dependent on contact.
TatrÄnanda, ye te samaį¹abrÄhmaį¹Ä kammavÄdÄ sayaį¹
kataį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹ paƱƱapenti, te vata aƱƱatra phassÄ paį¹isaį¹vedissantÄ«ti netaį¹ į¹hÄnaį¹ vijjati. Consider the ascetics and brahmins who teach the efficacy of deeds. In the case of those who assert that pleasure and pain are made by oneself, itās impossible that they will experience that without contact. ā¦
Yepi te ā¦peā¦
yepi te ā¦peā¦
yepi te samaį¹abrÄhmaį¹Ä kammavÄdÄ asayaį¹
kÄraį¹ aparaį¹
kÄraį¹ adhiccasamuppannaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹ paƱƱapenti, te vata aƱƱatra phassÄ paį¹isaį¹vedissantÄ«ti netaį¹ į¹hÄnaį¹ vijjati. In the case of those who assert that pleasure and pain arise anomalously, not made by oneself or another, itās impossible that they will experience that without contact.
KÄye vÄ hÄnanda, sati kÄyasaƱcetanÄhetu uppajjati ajjhattaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹. Änanda, as long as thereās a body, the intention that gives rise to bodily action causes pleasure and pain to arise in oneself. This forms the first part of AN 4.171, there addressed to āmendicantsā.āWhere there have been deeds, Änanda, personal happiness and suffering arise in consequence of the will there was in the deeds.
VÄcÄya vÄ hÄnanda, sati vacÄ«saƱcetanÄhetu uppajjati ajjhattaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹. As long as thereās a voice, the intention that gives rise to verbal action causes pleasure and pain to arise in oneself. Where there has been speechāwhere there has been thought, personal happiness and suffering arise in consequence of the will there was in the speechāin the thought.
Mane vÄ hÄnanda, sati manosaƱcetanÄhetu uppajjati ajjhattaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹ avijjÄpaccayÄ ca. As long as thereās a mind, the intention that gives rise to mental action causes pleasure and pain to arise in oneself. But this is only when dependent on ignorance. The tag avijjÄpaccayÄva (variant -ca), found also in the parallel at AN 4.171:1.3, appears tacked on to the completed sentence. Perhaps the purpose is to clarify that the mere presence of body, speech, and mind is not sufficient for kammic intentions, as arahants have body, speech, and mind but do not make kamma. The closing section of the discourse also addresses this topic.
SÄmaį¹ vÄ taį¹, Änanda, kÄyasaį¹
khÄraį¹ abhisaį¹
kharoti, yaį¹paccayÄssa taį¹ uppajjati ajjhattaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹. By oneself one instigates the choice that gives rise to bodily, verbal, and mental action, conditioned by which that pleasure and pain arise in oneself. Either we of ourselves, Änanda, plan those planned deeds conditioned by ignorance, whence so caused arises personal happiness and suffering.
Pare vÄ taį¹, Änanda, kÄyasaį¹
khÄraį¹ abhisaį¹
kharonti, yaį¹paccayÄssa taį¹ uppajjati ajjhattaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹. Or else others instigate the choice ā¦ This anticipates the Abhidhamma term sasaį¹
khÄrika, intentions that are prompted or instigated by another. For example, one might feel hungry and say, āLetās eatā. Or someone else might say to you, āLetās eatā. In both cases there is still moral responsibility for choices, but in the latter it is to some degree mitigated.or others plan those planned deeds that we do conditioned by ignorance, whence so conditioned arises personal happiness and suffering.
SampajÄno vÄ taį¹, Änanda, kÄyasaį¹
khÄraį¹ abhisaį¹
kharoti yaį¹paccayÄssa taį¹ uppajjati ajjhattaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹. One instigates the choice after deliberation ā¦ āDeliberateā (sampajÄna) means one is aware before, during, and after (MN 61:12.1, Bu Pc 1:2.2.2). Compare the legal concept āpre-meditatedā.Either they are done deliberately,
AsampajÄno vÄ taį¹, Änanda, kÄyasaį¹
khÄraį¹ abhisaį¹
kharoti yaį¹paccayÄssa taį¹ uppajjati ajjhattaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹. Or else one instigates the choice without deliberation ā¦ or we do them unwittingly.
SÄmaį¹ vÄ taį¹, Änanda, vacÄ«saį¹
khÄraį¹ abhisaį¹
kharoti yaį¹paccayÄssa taį¹ uppajjati ajjhattaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹. Thence both ways arises personal happiness and suffering. So also is it where there has been speech,
Pare vÄ taį¹, Änanda, vacÄ«saį¹
khÄraį¹ abhisaį¹
kharonti yaį¹paccayÄssa taį¹ uppajjati ajjhattaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹.
SampajÄno vÄ taį¹, Änanda ā¦peā¦ where there has been thought.
asampajÄno vÄ taį¹, Änanda, vacÄ«saį¹
khÄraį¹ abhisaį¹
kharoti yaį¹paccayÄssa taį¹ uppajjati ajjhattaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹.
SÄmaį¹ vÄ taį¹, Änanda, manosaį¹
khÄraį¹ abhisaį¹
kharoti yaį¹paccayÄssa taį¹ uppajjati ajjhattaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹. Either we plan, speaking, thinking deliberately
Pare vÄ taį¹, Änanda, manosaį¹
khÄraį¹ abhisaį¹
kharonti yaį¹paccayÄssa taį¹ uppajjati ajjhattaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹. or others plan, so that we speak, think unwittingly.
SampajÄno vÄ taį¹, Änanda ā¦peā¦
asampajÄno vÄ taį¹, Änanda, manosaį¹
khÄraį¹ abhisaį¹
kharoti yaį¹paccayÄssa taį¹ uppajjati ajjhattaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹. Thence arises personal happiness and suffering.
Imesu, Änanda, dhammesu avijjÄ anupatitÄ. Ignorance is included in all these things. In these six cases ignorance is followed after.
AvijjÄya tveva, Änanda, asesavirÄganirodhÄ so kÄyo na hoti yaį¹paccayÄssa taį¹ uppajjati ajjhattaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹. SÄ vÄcÄ na hoti yaį¹paccayÄssa taį¹ uppajjati ajjhattaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹. So mano na hoti yaį¹paccayÄssa taį¹ uppajjati ajjhattaį¹ sukhadukkhaį¹. But when ignorance fades away and ceases with no residue left behind, that body, that voice, and that mind no longer exist dependent on which that pleasure and pain arise in oneself. The sentence has a conditional structure which limits and specifies its application. It is not that the body per se has disappeared. Rather, it is that body, namely the one dependent on ignorance, which no longer exists to create kamma. The sentence exemplifies specific conditionality: this body ceases, and that pleasure and pain no longer arise. An arahant experiences pleasure and pain as a result of past life choices, but does not actively create new kammic feelings.But from the utter fading away and cessation of ignorance, Änanda, those deeds are not, whence so conditioned arises personal happiness and suffering. Neither is that speech, nor that thought.
Khettaį¹ taį¹ na hoti ā¦peā¦ vatthu taį¹ na hoti ā¦peā¦ Äyatanaį¹ taį¹ na hoti ā¦peā¦ adhikaraį¹aį¹ taį¹ na hoti yaį¹paccayÄssa taį¹ uppajjati ajjhattaį¹ sukhadukkhanāti. That field does not exist, that ground does not exist, that dimension does not exist, that foundation does not exist, dependent on which that pleasure and pain arise in oneself.ā Adhikaraį¹a as āfoundationā or āsubstratumā is attested in Sanskrit (eg. TattvÄrtha SÅ«tra 1.7).As field they are not; as base they are not; as wherewithal they are not; as occasion they are not, that so conditioned there might arise personal happiness and suffering.ā
PaƱcamaį¹.